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Research Article
The Impact of Parents' and Spouses' Education
on Divorce Rates in Norway
Torkild Hovde Lyngstad 
1
Abstract
According to both economic and sociological theory, a couple's divorce rate may be
influenced by their own educational attainment, that of their parents, and whether they
have taken further education after marriage, although predictions are ambiguous.
However, these three variables have never been included simultaneously and few
studies have included both partners' characteristics. A discrete-time hazard model based
on register and census data on 54178 Norwegian first marriages started 1980-1999
reveals a very strong negative educational gradient in divorce risk and no particularly
harmful influence of heterogamy. Parent's education exerts a small positive effect,
however. Among couples with the same current level of education, those who have
taken education after entry into marriage display the highest divorce rate.
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1. Introduction
Theoretical contributions on the impact of the spouses' educational attainments and
parental educations on the divorce rate usually assume that any gradients in divorce risk
are determined jointly by both spouses' characteristics. However, empirical studies of
divorce determinants have often been based on data that include the educational
attainment of one spouse only (e.g. de Rose 1992; Hoem 1997). Besides, some authors
have had access to data on both husband's and wife's education but not considered the
combined effects (e.g. Bracher et al 1993; Ono 1998; Jalovaara 2001).
Of the relatively few studies that have addressed the joint impact of spouses'
education, results reported for Nordic countries point towards negative effects of
education on divorce risk (Kravdal and Noack 1989; Hansen 1995; Jalovaara 2003), but
the studies of other countries are less conclusive: Poortman and Kalmijn (2002) found
positive effects of the wife's education on divorce risk in the Netherlands. The most
important conclusion of Bumpass and Sweet (1972) was that educational heterogamy
had no positive influence on divorce risk. Tzeng and Mare (1995) found negative
effects of the couple's education in the U.S.
Other studies have dealt with the importance of social background, measured
either as the social class or education of parents (e.g. Bumpass et al 1991; Hoem and
Hoem 1992; Bracher et al 1993; Hansen 1995; Berrington and Diamond 1999;
Jalovaara 2001). The bulk of the evidence suggests that individuals from "bourgeois"
backgrounds, or who have well-educated parents, have slightly higher divorce rates
than others (but see Bumpass et al 1991 for a counter-example). The impact of
schooling after entry into marriage has also attracted some attention. For example,
Tzeng and Mare (1995) found that increases in husband's education during marriage
raised divorce risk, whereas there was no such effect for wives. However, no studies
have included this variable as well as spouses' education (as a combined variable) and
parents' education (also as a combined variable) in the same model. Given the
potentially large correlation between them, it might well be that such a model gives
estimates that are substantially different from those obtained in simpler models.
Moreover, educational attainment is a variable that is thought to affect the
economic organization of the household but also grant individuals non-economic
rewards. These effects might work in opposite directions. In this paper, this theoretical
ambiguity is taken into account by estimating effects of education net of both spouses'
income, leaving us with estimates of the non-economic effect of education on divorce
risk.Demographic Research – Volume 10, Article 5
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2. Theoretical Arguments
The theoretical framework used in this paper is the general economic-demographic
approach to family dynamics. It is built on a broad concept of the costs and utility of the
available modes of family organization. The framework is similar to rational choice
theory, which many sociologists and demographers employ in their theorizing. The
basic assumption is that each individual tries to maximize utility by entering or leaving
unions (England and Farkas 1986; Becker 1991).
For individuals to marry, entering a marriage must yield certain benefits. These
benefits are not to be understood here as only being of an economic nature. Rather,
benefits as emotional support and companionship are all included in the utility from the
union, along with economic benefits.
To locate potential mates, each individual searches in a market of potential
marriage partners for an optimal match. As this search entails certain costs, the
individual must weigh the expected marginal gain from searching longer against the
costs of further search. The marginal increase in utility from finding a better partner is
dependent on structural constraints such as the age and sex structure and other
characteristics of the population in which the search is made (Fossett and Kiecolt 1991;
South and Lloyd 1995).
The total benefits of a union with the available partner, net of the costs of being
married determine the spouses' gain from marriage. After internal negotiations on the
division of the gain from marriage, both persons must have no available alternative that
would yield a higher expected gain. It is important to note that the gain from marriage is
determined for the couple as a unit, and not individually for the two spouses and then
pooled. The spouses' individual shares of the gain are determined through bargaining
between the two spouses.
If the gain from marriage drops so that any spouse's share of the gain falls below
the expected utility from being single, or the expected utility from a remarriage with an
alternative partner, he or she will consider divorce. These considerations must include
search costs and costs associated with the divorce itself (such as establishing a new
household, any stigma connected to marital disruption, or the breakdown of common
social networks). If the marginal gain in utility from a break-up outweighs the costs, the
person will file for divorce.
Many factors are thought to partly determine the gain from marriage. Examples
include children, housing, knowledge about each others preferences and habits, social
networks, any wealth the spouses may have acquired, their beliefs and worldviews, and
so on.
Becker and colleagues argue that the degree to which the spouses' specialize in the
production of market goods, i.e. labor force participation, or domestic goods, i.e.Demographic Research – Volume 10, Article 5
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housekeeping and childrearing, is positively correlated with the gain from marriage.
However, this specialization model was outlined during a period of time when most
women did not take part in the labor force. During the last few decades, wives'
participation rates have soared in concert with policy reforms and attitudinal changes
towards gender equality. The specialization model is therefore likely to be of much less
relevance today than when it was first proposed, and particularly so in the Norwegian
context given the high rates of female labor force participation and university
enrolment. Oppenheimer (1994) has suggested that a "pooling-of-resources"-model in
which the gain from marriage is highest when both spouses contribute economically to
the household is more appropriate for the current situation than Becker's specialization
model.
Which of these models that best portray the economic organization of Norwegian
marriages in the period 1980-1999 is an empirical question, but is left for future
analyses. The economic variables serve here as control variables, used to remove the
contribution of economic variables from the effect of educational attainment on divorce
risk.
2.1 Educational attainment and divorce
In Becker's theory of the union formation process it is argued that highly educated men
tend to marry highly educated women and less educated men tend to marry less
educated women (Becker 1977, 1991). Becker sees this pattern as the result of a
competition for the partners with the highest education, and assumes that people regards
individuals that hold high educations as superior to those who hold low educations.
Hence, a couple where at least one spouse has a higher education will enjoy a higher
gain from marriage than a couple where none of the spouses have higher educations.
Moreover, it is also argued that there is a premium on the gain from marriage for
couples where both have long educations.
The clear-cut picture of the impact educational attainment has on divorce risk can,
however, be confused by another effect on divorce risk working through economic
potential. A wife with a higher education has better labor market prospects and earnings
potential than a wife with a lower education. In marriages where the wife has a long
education, her better economic prospects reduce the relative benefits from specializing
and will help her gain economic independence. The degree of specialization will be
lower in couples where the wife has a comparatively high education, and hence is there
a positive effect of wives' education on the divorce risk working through their economic
potential.Demographic Research – Volume 10, Article 5
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Thus, there might be two opposing effects from education on the risk of divorce:
One being a direct (in the sense that it does not operate through economic factors) effect
of education, increasing the gain from marriage, and one being an effect working
indirectly through reduced specialization, potentially decreasing the gain from
marriage. Becker et al (1977) admit that the net effect of education on divorce risk is
theoretically ambiguous if the specialization model is correct.
If one can filter out the effect of potential earnings, and be left with the non-
economic effect of education that raises the gain from marriage, the effect of
educational attainment on divorce risk should be negative. The relative divorce risks
predicted for the various combinations of the spouses' educational attainment is
illustrated in figure 1.
Low High
Husband's education
Figure 1: Educational gradients in divorce risk predicted by the economic-
demographic approach
2.2 Parental education and divorce
Becker et al (1977) argue that there should be positive assortative mating on all
variables that are not good substitutes for, and in effect strong correlates of, earning
power. They treat social background similarly to how they deal with wealth, physical
attractiveness, and, apart from the complications related to economic potential,
educational attainment: They assume that social background is positively correlated
with the gain from marriage, and therefore that having a high social background reduces
divorce risk.Demographic Research – Volume 10, Article 5
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In this paper, social background is measured by the education of the spouses'
parents. The predictions of divorce risk gradients in a variable that is positively sorted
corresponds to the ones shown in figure 1 for the direct effect of education in divorce
risk: Compared to a couple where none have highly educated parents, the divorce risk is
lower if at least one of the spouses have parents with high educations and lowest if both
of the spouses have parents with high education.
From the existing empirical studies one may find alternative understandings of the
role social origin can play in marital disruption: Hoem and Hoem (1992) suggested that
social background, in their case measured as the father's occupational class, is
positively correlated with divorce risk due to some socio-cultural factor found in the
upper and middle classes that makes divorce easier in some way (i.e. reducing the costs
of divorce). They do not elaborate on the nature of this factor, however.
Two other possible explanations are related to getting economic support from the
spouses' parents: Well-educated parents are likely to be better off financially and more
able to support their children through rough times. But, the prediction on divorce risk is
ambiguous: The parents could transfer money to their offspring in order to either stay
married in times where the couple's resources is strained or they could facilitate a
divorce financially when the spouse's own income is not sufficient to establish a new
household.
2.3 Educational homogamy and divorce risk
Becker's micro-economic approach views the formation of assortative mating patterns
as the result of a competition for persons with the highest socioeconomic status,
education, wealth, et cetera.
However, there is another plausible view of how such patterns are formed. This
competing view suggests that the spouses desire similarity in characteristics such as
educational attainment, and not necessarily a partner with the highest education or
social background. Thus, persons may value marriages with individuals with the same
educational attainment as themselves higher than marriages with a person that has the
highest possible educational attainment. 
Implying that there is some kind of frustration related to not being similar in
characteristics such as educational attainment or social background, some researchers
have also predicted that homogamy in education and social background should promote
marital stability (Lewis and Spanier 1979). The pattern of relative divorce risks




Figure 2: Educational gradients in divorce risk predicted by the homogamy-
oriented approach
2.4 Further education and divorce
An increase in education would affect the gain from marriage and cause a redistribution
of the gain between the spouses. Either spouse's further education during marriage may
therefore have an independent effect on divorce risk.
Although the higher qualification might make a positive contribution to the
marriage, the change in itself might be a disruptive factor (Tzeng and Mare 1995).
Results from qualitative studies corroborate these ideas and suggest that such effects
may be particularly strong for wives' further education (Hochschild 1989; Moxnes
1990).
The effect of obtaining further education can be identified if one controls for the
newly obtained level of education, which is done in the present study. One could also
search for interaction effects between current educational attainment and further
education, i.e. the effect of moving from heterogamy to homogamy in educational
attainment (or vice versa), but that problem is very complex and is left to a separate
study.Demographic Research – Volume 10, Article 5
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3. Data and Methods
The data set used in this study includes the date of marriage and divorce (if any), date of
any spousal deaths, the spouses' previous marital status (used to select first order
marriages), time series from 1980 to 1999 of each spouse's annual income, educational
attainment, and educational activity, the educational level of each spouse's parents, and
the individual fertility history of each spouse.
The fertility histories include all childbirths that any of the spouses have
experienced up to the end of 2000. Information on each child's date of birth, sex and the
PINs of its parents (used to check for premarital childbearing with other persons than
the spouse) is included.
The parents' educational levels are mainly taken from the Population Census of
1980, but if it is missing from this census, information from the 1970 census is used
wherever possible.
There is no indicator of average working hours. A measure of hourly wage would
be a better indicator of the person's true economic potential than annual income, but is
not available.
The data set is, due to restrictions from the Data Inspectorate, limited to marriages
where the husband is born in 1940, 1945, 1950, 1955, 1960, 1965, 1970, 1975, or 1980.
Only first marriages for both partners are included due to the special selection processes
that are at work in second and higher-order unions. To avoid any confounding factors
related to ethnic intermarriage, only couples where both spouses are Norwegian-born
are selected for analysis. After the selection criteria are applied, the final data set
consists of 54178 marriages.
I have chosen to employ discrete-time hazard regression models in the analysis
(Allison 1984, Blossfeld and Rohwer 1995). The dependent variable is the conditional
probability (measured in log-odds) of a couple's divorce in year t, given that the couple
was at risk at the start of year t.
Formal divorce is taken as the time of dissolution, although the time of separation
could be a more appropriate measure for the break-up. The rationale for this is that
divorce is an irreversible event and a substantial number of separated couples reconcile
without reporting to the population register when they move back together.
All independent variables are categorical covariates at either nominal or ordinal
response levels. The time-dependent variables are lagged two calendar years. This is
done because the Norwegian authorities, to grant a no-fault divorce, require the couple
to be separated for at least one year prior to the formal divorce. Moreover, the
explanatory variables are measured at an accuracy of one year. This requires a lag of
one year to avoid any anticipatory regressors. For the same reason, the temporal unit is
calendar years.Demographic Research – Volume 10, Article 5
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Each spouse's educational attainment is coded as a categorical variable by
grouping a standard classification of 9 education levels into a three-level scale: primary
education, secondary education (mostly three years of either vocational training or
academic preparatory courses), and tertiary education. These variables are time-
dependent, and therefore updated for every subsequent marriage-year.
Similarly to Jalovaara (2003), I study the combination of spouses' educational
attainment. Cross-classifying the spouses' educational levels gives a 3x3 matrix of
combinations. The middle cell in the matrix is arbitrarily chosen as a baseline category.
Another 2x2 matrix variable measures if any increases have occurred in the spouses'
educational attainment during their marriage.
Parental education is measured for each spouse by the highest level of education
recorded for either the spouse's father or the spouse's mother. Having at least one parent
with secondary schooling is regarded as a high level of parental education. This
information is used to compute a 2x2 matrix variable of combinations of parental
education.
Unfortunately, there is no data on the economic resources of the spouses' parents.
Lack of control for parental economic resources may confound the relationship between
parental education and divorce risk, and make it harder to understand the nature of any
gradients in divorce risk by parental education.
It is likely that the couples included in this study are selected into marriage from
cohabitation by various socio-economic variables. Kravdal (1999) reports a positive
effect of educational attainment on the transition rate from cohabitation into first
marriage. This may indicate that cohabiting couples with shorter educations that marry,
rather than remain cohabitants or split up, may be a (strongly) selected group of firmer
unions that are less divorce-prone. If that argument is valid, the results presented here
will be underestimating lesser-educated couples' risk of union dissolution.
4 Results and discussion
The final data set contains 508470 marriage-years, with a total of 8086 divorces. Table
1 shows the frequency distributions of marriage-years for all the variables included in
the model. Note that the classifications of the variables age at marriage and income
differ for husband and wife.
The only variable where missing values are likely to bias the results is the indicator
of parental education. To remedy this, a separate category indicating a missing value
was constructed and added to the model along with the categorical variable measuring
the spouses' parental education. The estimates for the dummy variable do not indicateDemographic Research – Volume 10, Article 5
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Wife 4+ years older 2.5
Age homogamous 65.8
Husband 4+ years older 31.7Demographic Research – Volume 10, Article 5
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Further education during marriage
None 89.4
Husband completed further ed. 4.2
Wife completed further ed. 4.9






Number and age of Children
No children 24.4
1, aged 0 years 7.4
1, aged 1-6 years 18.4
1, aged 7+ years 2.6
2, aged 0 years 6.2
2, youngest aged 1-6 years 23.3
2, youngest aged 7+ years 5.8
3, youngest aged 0 years 2.7
3, youngest aged 1-6 years 8.9
3, youngest aged 7+ years 1.4Demographic Research – Volume 10, Article 5
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Table 2.  Divorce risk estimates for all variables from the discrete-time hazard
regression model. Odds ratios
Variable/Category Odds ratio Lower C.L. Upper C.L.
Duration of marriage
0 0.00 0.00 0.01
1 0.03 0.02 0.04
2 0.26 0.23 0.30
3 0.62 0.56 0.69
4 0.91 0.83 0.99
5-7 1.00 . .
8-10 0.96 0.89 1.03
11-14 0.81 0.74 0.89
15+ 0.62 0.55 0.71
Age difference
Wife 4+ yrs 1.44 1.22 1.69
Homogamous 1.00 . .
Husband 4+ yrs 1.21 1.13 1.29
Husband's age at marriage
--24 1.25 1.17 1.33
25--29 1.00 . .
30-34 0.86 0.79 0.93
35+ 0.74 0.63 0.86
Wife's age at marriage
--19 1.97 1.77 2.21
20-24 1.41 1.31 1.51
25--29 1.00 . .
30-34 0.68 0.60 0.78
35+ 0.44 0.33 0.58
Children with others before marriage
None 1.00 . .
Both 2.06 1.61 2.62
Wife 1.83 1.66 2.03
Husband 2.21 1.99 2.46
Premarital childbearing
No 1.00 . .
Yes 1.62 1.53 1.72
Number and age of children
No children 1.00 . .
1, 0 years 0.30 0.26 0.36
1, 1-6 yrs 0.76 0.70 0.83
1, 7+ yrs 0.94 0.81 1.08
2, 0 yrs 0.24 0.20 0.28
2, 1-6 yrs 0.55 0.50 0.61
2, 7+ yrs 0.65 0.56 0.75
3+, 0 yrs 0.15 0.11 0.19
3+, 1-6 yrs 0.42 0.37 0.48
3+, 7+ yrs 0.51 0.40 0.64Demographic Research – Volume 10, Article 5
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Table 2 (cont.):  Divorce risk estimates for all variables from the discrete-time hazard
regression model. Odds ratios
Variable/Category Odds ratio Lower C.L. Upper C.L.
Educational activity
None enrolled 1.00 . .
Wife enrolled 1.87 1.72 2.05
Husband enrolled 1.07 0.94 1.21
Both enrolled 1.11 0.88 1.39
Husband's income
0K-50K 1.47 1.36 1.59
51K-100K 1.08 1.02 1.14
101K-150K 1.00 . .
151K-200K 1.00 0.91 1.12
201K+ 1.11 0.96 1.29
Wife's income
0K-25K 0.43 0.38 0.48
26K-50K 0.48 0.43 0.54
51K-100K 0.60 0.55 0.66
101K-150K 1.00 . .
151K+ 1.13 0.88 1.45
Education level (wife/husband)
Low/Low 1.84 1.64 2.06
Low/Medium 1.55 1.43 1.68
Low/High 1.26 0.83 1.92
Medium/Low 1.31 1.22 1.42
Medium/Medium 1.00 . .
Medium/High 0.69 0.62 0.78
High/Low 0.85 0.59 1.21
High/Medium 0.53 0.47 0.60
High/High 0.42 0.36 0.48
Parental education (wife/husband)
Low/Low 1.00 . .
Low/High 1.19 1.09 1.23
High/Low 1.16 1.11 1.27
High/High 1.45 1.34 1.56
Further education (wife/husband)
None 1.00 . .
Yes/No 1.43 1.27 1.66
No/Yes 1.23 1.09 1.38
Yes/Yes 1.41 1.13 1.76
-2 log likelihood (no covariates) 83015.38
-2 log likelihood (with covariates) 69375.47Demographic Research – Volume 10, Article 5
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any strong bias related to missing values on the parental education variable. All of the
remaining cases where there are missing values on other variables are deleted from the
analysis. Table 2 shows the results from the discrete-time hazard regression with all
analysis variables included.
4.1 Large differentials in divorce risk by education
The results show a general pattern of negative effects of educational attainment on a
couple's annual odds of divorce, net of all other covariates. The divorce risk declines
with a higher level of the husband's educational attainment and with a high level of the
wife's educational attainment. This is in line with the economic-demographic theoretical
predictions, even when the effect of wives' increased economic potential due to higher
education is taken into account.
A negative relationship between educational attainment and divorce risk also
accords with most of the earlier research on this topic from the Nordic countries. The
differentials found in the other Nordic studies have, however, been smaller in
magnitude (Kravdal and Noack 1989, Hoem 1997, Jalovaara 2001, 2003). From other
countries, results have indicated a positive (or close to zero) effect of education on
divorce. In Australia, Bracher et al (1993), found no relation between education and
divorce. Ono (1998) and Poortman and Kalmijn (2002) found, for the United States and
the Netherlands respectively, positive effects of educational attainment on divorce risk.
It is unclear why education matters more for divorce risk in Norway than in many
other countries. Some additional control variables that are likely to be correlated with
educational attainment are included, in particular parental education. This may give
higher point estimates for the education gradients.
Moreover, the Finnish study by Jalovaara (2003) had only left-truncated marital
histories available, and may therefore be underestimating education effects on divorce
risk due to attrition (Guo 1993). Such underestimation can be particularly strong for
education, as Jalovaara (2002) also shows that the education effects are at their
strongest during early marital durations.
The effect of the wife's education level seems to be stronger than the
corresponding effect of the husband's education. When economic potential is controlled
for, one should expect that effects of educational attainment show a symmetric pattern
as the one found by Jalovaara (2003). The reason for the asymmetric pattern of
gradients found in this study can be explained by the higher part-time employment rates
among Norwegian wives compared with Finnish wives. Wives working part-time will
have lower incomes than those working full-time, net of education differences in wages.Demographic Research – Volume 10, Article 5
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This means that economic potential of Norwegian women is not fully captured by the
income variables, and an asymmetric pattern of gradients is observed.
4.2 A positive effect from parental education
In the literature, there is no conclusive evidence on the effect of parental education,
social class background, or homogamy in such variables on divorce risk.
Bumpass et al (1991) found a weak curvilinear effect of mother's education on
divorce risk in the United States. A British study has found that having a lower-class
background reduces divorce risk (Berrington and Diamond 1999). In the results of the
present analysis, couples with well-educated parents run significantly higher risks of
divorce net of all other covariates. There are positive effects of the same magnitude of
both spouses' parental education on the couple's divorce risk. While Hansen (1995)
reported lower divorce risks for couples that are homogamous with respect to social
class, these results provide no indication of any protective effect for couples that are
homogamous with respect to parental education. On the contrary, couples where both
spouses have educated parents run an added risk of divorce.
This finding may be attributed to several different explanations. Hoem and Hoem
(1992) suggested that the reason for an elevated risk of divorce for couples with
educated parents could be found in the "bourgeois culture" among the highly educated.
An alternative explanation regards the economic resources of the spouse's parents,
possibly causing an "independence effect". If a spouse has parents that are willing to
economically support their offspring after divorce, the spouse might look upon the
marital disruption process with fewer concerns. Couples with well-off parents may also
get financial assistance in rough times that could reduce marital discord and
consequently the divorce risk, but as the pattern show positive gradients by parental
education this mechanism cannot dominate the process.
A final explanation is connected to parental divorce, which has been shown to
influence various aspects of individuals' demographic behavior including divorce risk
(Cherlin et al 1995; Kiernan and Cherlin 1999; Berrington and Diamond 1999). The
children of early divorcees will have more information on how the divorce process can
be handled, and may consequently view marital disruption differently than spouses with
parents that are still married. In order for the relationship between parental education
and divorce risk to be confounded by parental divorce, the effect of the spouses' own
education on divorce risk must have been positive for the marriage cohorts to which the
parents of the couples in this study belongs.
Most of the parents of the couples included in this study were born throughout the
1930s. When they married, it was both socially and economically costly to divorce.Demographic Research – Volume 10, Article 5
136 http://www.demographic-research.org
After a divorce one could experience sanctions from peers and society, and a social
support system for single parents was yet to be established. Therefore, the persons who
divorced at that time may have been some kind of innovators with more cultural
resources to withstand stigma attached to divorce and to cope with the economic strains
a marital break-up induces on divorcees. As such resources often are correlated with
educational attainment, this would lead to a positive correlation between the education
level and the divorce rate for the parents of the couples in the present study.
The above argument implies that the effects of education on divorce risk,
throughout the second demographic transition, must have changed from being positive
for the parent generation into being negative for the next generation. Blossfeld et al
(1995) argue that there is a bell-shaped relationship between divorce risk and
educational attainment across time. Norway should, according to their hypothesis, be at
the very right end of the bell-shaped curve as wives' educational attainment is
comparatively high and social acceptance of divorce and "alternative" family forms is
strong.
A country like Italy, with lower female employment rates and a lesser acceptance
of cohabitation and marital dissolution, should be at an earlier stage of the second
demographic transition. The relationship between wives' education and divorce risk
should therefore be negative in Italy, as found by for example de Rose (1992).
It is not extremely unlikely that such changes have taken place throughout the last
decades, but it would be contradictory with both earlier research on education gradients
in divorce risk for the 1968 marriage cohort (Kravdal and Noack 1989) and with recent
results from the United States reporting that divorce risk factors show a large degree of
stability across cohorts (Teachman 2002).
As limitations in the data make it impossible to fully understand the mechanisms
behind the positive effect of parental education on divorce risk, this problem should be
explored in greater detail using data on the demographic characteristics and economic
resources of the spouses' parents.
4.3 Further education leads to an elevated risk of divorce
Tzeng and Mare (1995) found that changes in both the wife's income and her
educational attainment slightly increased dissolution risk. However, they found no
effect of increases in the husband's educational attainment on divorce risk.
This analysis finds that further education for either spouse raises divorce risk.
Most pronounced are, however, the effects associated with an increase in her level of
education after marriage. But, even couples where only the husband has completed
further education during marriage run a risk of divorce.Demographic Research – Volume 10, Article 5
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A heightened risk of divorce after an increase in education may also be an artifact
of anticipation: A spouse in a low-quality marriage may be considering a break-up and
therefore also preparing for it by obtaining further education.
4.4 Control variables
Age at marriage is one of the best-documented determinants of divorce (Booth and
Edwards 1985, South 1995). For both spouses, marrying young heightens their risk of
divorcing. The effects found here are particularly strong for marriages with teenage
brides. Age heterogamy raises divorce risk with 21 per cent when the husband is the
oldest spouse, and 44 per cent when the wife is the oldest spouse.
Another strong correlate of divorce is the couple's parity and the age of their
youngest child (Waite and Lillard 1991, Andersson 1997). In the present analysis, the
effects from having an infant child reduce the divorce risk to a small fraction of that of
the baseline group consisting of couples without children. As the youngest child grows
older, divorce risk increases.
Earlier research has documented the importance of premarital childbearing for
divorce risk (Kravdal 1988, Tzeng and Mare 1995, Liu 2002). Two variables measuring
this were included in the model: One measures whether the couple initiated their own
fertility career within wedlock or not, and the other variable measures, for each spouse,
whether the spouse has had any children with someone else than the current partner
before marriage.
The results from this analysis indicate substantially higher divorce risks for
persons that initiate childbearing with someone else than their first marital partner. If
the husband has at least one child with a different woman than his wife before marriage,
the risk of divorce is 2.2 times higher than if he has no children with others before the
marriage. For the wife, the corresponding odds ratio is 1.8. If both have had children
with others before they married, the odds ratio is 2.0. The couples that have had a birth
with someone else than their first marital partner, most likely in an earlier informal
union, could hold more liberal values with respect to family life in general.
Kravdal (1988) reported a doubling of divorce risk for Norwegian couples that
initiated childbearing outside of marriage. Due to the rise in cohabitation and out-of-
wedlock fertility during the 1980s and 1990s, one would expect that this effect is now
lower. The results of this study indicate a relative divorce risk 1.6 times the baseline
risk for such couples.
For couples where the wife was enrolled, the odds of divorce were 1.9 times higher
than in the baseline group. The enrolment effect might be explained by several factors:
The poorer economic standing of student spouses, the possibly differing lifestylesDemographic Research – Volume 10, Article 5
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between studying spouses and employed spouses, or there might be a surplus of
potential mates in the student population increasing the likelihood of encountering a
partner superior to the current. This explanation requires, however, more information of
the student population.
However, if the divorce is anticipated, a spouse will be more likely to study in
order to prepare for the potential economical challenges that may follow. Although the
time lag between divorce and the explanatory variables is two calendar years,
preparations for single life might start even earlier.
Income effects conform to the specialization model, showing a negative effect on
the divorce rate of the husband's income and a positive effect on the divorce rate from
the wife's income.
5. Conclusion
By combining the characteristics of both marriage partners as theoretical contributions
imply, this paper is the first to simultaneously study the effect of spouses' educational
attainments, their parents' educations and completion of further education during
marriage.
Education effects on divorce are strongly negative in Norway. The results showed
no protective effect of educational homogamy. The magnitude of the divorce risk
differentials presented in this study is substantially larger than in any similar study on
this topic from the Nordic countries (e.g. Kravdal and Noack 1989; Hoem 1997;
Jalovaara 2001, 2002, 2003). A couple where both spouses have low levels of education
run a risk that is more than four-fold in magnitude compared to couples where both
have higher educations.
Parental education exerts a positive influence on divorce risk for both spouses.
Moreover, there is an added risk of divorce for couples where both partners have high
parental education levels. These findings lend support to a view suggesting that
transmission of liberal attitudes and more liberal norms towards marital disruption can
be a result of socialization in highly educated families, although this should be explored
in greater detail in future studies.
The third finding of this study is that if at least one spouse obtains further
education after marrying, the risk of divorce increases and does so independently of the
current level of education. Further education may be a stressor in marital life itself, but
the relationship might also be due to reverse causation: Anticipating divorce in a low-
quality marriage may provide an incentive to obtain further education as a preparation
for single life.Demographic Research – Volume 10, Article 5
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